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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties disagree on some points in their statement of facts on which 
some clarification is necessary. Respondent's Brief states that the Superior 
Court of Contra Costa County, California ordered Defendant/Appellant to pay 
$854.99 per month as child support and $450.00 per month spousal support. 
Appellant immediately objected to said Order and Petitioned said Court in 
California and filed a Motion to reconsider, or in the alternative, to have said 
Order set aside (Record on Appeal, p. 598). 
Further, Respondent's Brief states that Defendant/Appellant was 
delinquent in his child and spousal support in an amount of $19,574.85. Due 
to the pending reconsideration, the California Court had not issued a final 
Order upon which Utah could have even considered taking jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, Respondent "venue shopped" in Utah for over a year 
following the filing of her petition that Utah take jurisdiction over purported 
arrearages. Respondent was denied on April 29, 1988 that the State of Utah 
take jurisdiction over alleged child and spousal support arrearages by Judge 
Park (Record on Appeal, p. 100 and 163). 
Still, she persisted by again requesting the Court through new counsel 
to take such jurisdiction on October 20, 1988 before Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Howard Maetani (Record on Appeal, p. 441). She requested 
such again on review before Judge Park on February 7, 1989 at the hearing 
from which this appeal arose (Record on Appeal, p. 550 and 763). 
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Commissioner Maetain and Judge Park denied her further requests a second 
and third time. 
Furthermore, California having kept jurisdiction over said subject matter 
later determined that based on Appellant's previous payment record he owed 
no support whatsoever to Respondent. (See Order of Court, Declaration of 
Dennis DuWayne Donithorne, and Notice of Intended Decision attached as 
Addendum "A"). The Respondent did not object to the Intended Decision and 
it became a final Order during the end of July, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First. Respondent argues that Rule 11(e)(1) and (2) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals and certain case law precedents support that 
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed for Appellant's failure to provide this 
Court with a transcript. In fact, none of the cases cited by Respondent were 
dismissed on such grounds. Denied, perhaps, dismissed, no. Further, no 
similar case has ever been so dismissed on such grounds nation wide insofar 
as Appellant is aware, having reviewed all such published and unpublished 
cases on a West Law access terminal on February 27, 1990. 
Nevertheless, in support of her contention for such dismissal, Respondent 
allegedly quotes from one of the cases cited by her in the middle of page 5 
of her Response Brief. No such quote exists in any of the cases cited in 
Burke. Woodward, or either of the other two cases referred to there by 
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Respondent. 
More importantly, the facts of the instant case are clearly distinguishable 
from the cases cited by Respondent in that Appellant has been financially 
estopped from providing a transcript, as is well documented under Point I 
hereinafter. 
Second. Appellant does not dispute that this Court has held that some 
findings can be found in other court documents as supported by Erwin, cited 
on page 6 of the Response Brief, Responded contends that the trial court, 
purportedly adequately familiarized itself with the file as well as the evidence 
and testimony adduced at the hearing. Nevertheless, Appellant argues that 
however well it did so, it failed entirely pursuant to Rule 52(a) to make any 
findings of fact and conclusions of law whatsoever. It did not do so either 
orally or otherwise at the same time or subsequent to issuing the final 
pronounced Order upon which the Order itself was based. Respondent did not 
dispute such in her Brief. This Court should reverse the trial Court's decision 
based on a review of the available record by this court. In the alternative, 
it should remand this case to the trial court to make proper findings and 
conclusions. 
Third. Respondent is neither entitled to an award of attorney's fees and 
costs at the trial court level nor for her defense of this appeal. In no way 
did Respondent deny either the unethical behavior of her counsel or his 
adamant refusal to communicate and negotiate settlement of any of the issues 
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to avoid litigation on the trial level. Both were alleged by Appellant in his 
appeal brief. 
Further, it was the Appellant, not the Respondent, who first requested 
that the trial Court review and reconsider the recommendations made by the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner (Record on Appeal, p. 448). 
Last, there is no evidence whatsoever that Appellant's behavior in this 
matter has been inappropriate or that his appeal is frivolously without merit 
as stated at the end of Respondent's Summary of the Argument on page 7. 
Had the Respondent truly thought so she could have had it dismissed upon 
proof thereof pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS FINANCIAL INABILITY TO PAY FOR A 
TRANSCRIPT ESTOPPED HIM FROM OBTAINING AND 
PROVIDING A TRANSCRIPT TO THIS COURT AND IS NOT AN 
IMPEDIMENT TO THIS COURT REVERSING THE TRIAL 
COURTS DECISION OR REMANDING THIS CASE TO THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
A) Appellant's Financial Inability to Pay for a Transcript. 
Appellant acknowledges that Rule 11(e)(1) and (2) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals impose a duty upon the Appellant to request or order 
a transcript. Appellant did so by orally requesting a transcript from the trial 
Court reporter. Appellant was unable to pay the cost which the reporter 
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required for a transcript. Appellant filed a Request For Transcript under an 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity at no cost, both with the trial Court (Record on 
Appeal, p. 785) and with this Court (Appellate Record, filed June 15, 1989). 
Both the foregoing are reproduced herein as Addendum "B". 
Said Request was certified to each Court by Appellant's filing the same 
in each Court and was certified to opposing counsel as well by mailing 
certificate. A courtesy copy of said request was given to the Court reporter. 
Respondent flagrantly misrepresented to this Court at the bottom of page 10 
of her Response Brief that Appellant had not met the foregoing duty. 
Rule 24 (k) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals [Briefs, 
Requirements and sanctions] states, 
All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings, and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on 
motion or sua sponte by the court, and/or the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer, (Emphasis added) 
The above referred to part of Respondent's Brief should be stricken for 
being burdensome and scandalous. Such misrepresentation by counsel on 
Respondent's behalf is also relevant to the issue before this court of attorney's 
fees both at the trial and appellate level. 
This case may be clearly distinguished from Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1985) and Burke v. Burke. 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah 
1986) both of which were cited by Respondent. Neither case included a 
impecunious litigant who had been denied a request for transcripts at no cost 
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as in the case at bar. 
Appellant also acknowledges that the Advisory Committee Note included 
as Exhibit "B" in the Response Brief states that it is Appellant's responsibility 
to order a transcript. Again, this he did. Nevertheless, Appellant has been 
financially barred from obtaining such a transcript. The trial Court reporter, 
Richard Tatton, understandably refused to work up a transcript absent being 
pre-paid his charge of several hundred dollars for such services. [See Smith 
v. Wilson. 579 P.2d 339, (Utah, 1978) where trial Court stenographer was 
denied relief sought for payment of transcript provided to Carbon County 
District attorneys absent prepayment for the same and where no contract or 
agreement arose for such payment.] 
Further, it should be noted that the same Advisory Committee Note 
commenting on Paragraph (e) of Rule 11 states that nothing prevents a 
Respondent from ordering and providing to this Court any part of a transcript 
not provided by an Appellant. Nothing prevented the Respondent herein from 
so doing where she felt such was requisite to her. Respondent filed no such 
request and nothing, other than perhaps her own limited financial resources, 
prevented her from doing so. 
On December 28, 1988, in anticipation of the possibility of filing an 
appeal, Appellant filed a motion with the trial Court to allow him to pursue 
this case "in forma pauperis." (Record on Appeal, p. 468) Appellant had 
appeared in this matter, nearly "ab initio," as an impecunious litigant. Said 
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Motion went beyond the mere waiver of filing and service fees pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 21-7-3. It specifically requested that any necessary 
transcripts be provided to him at no cost or at least set up on a deferred 
payment plan. Said Motion was accompanied by an Affidavit (Record on 
Appeal, p. 486 and 487) and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities citing 
many good supporting precedents (Record on Appeal, pp.518 - 523). 
Nevertheless, the trial Court denied Appellant's motion on April 28, 1989 
(Record on Appeal, p. 770). 
Since filing said Motion, Appellant's financial condition has not improved. 
The cost of obtaining such transcripts equate to approximately two months of 
his gross income currently and during the pendency of this entire action. The 
denial of Appellant's above referred to Motion has financially estopped 
Appellant from providing this Court with a transcript. Appellant could not 
borrow from family or friends, let alone commercial sources, nor does he have 
the ability to pay back, the amount necessary for a transcript. 
B) The Issue of Appellant's Request for a Free Transcript is a Case of First 
Impression in the State of Utah, 
Such a fact situation has not come before this Court or the Utah 
Supreme Court before, insofar as Appellant is aware. This particular fact 
situation is a case of first impression in Utah. Appellant contends that his 
financial inability to provide a transcript should preclude this Court from, not 
just a dismissal, but also a denial of his appeal, based simply on the lack of 
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such providence. 
The rulings issued in precedent cases from other states governing 
similarly situated impecunious appellants bringing similar divorce related issues 
before their Courts bear in mind the importance of achieving justice, 
particularly in cases of "Pro Se" appellants. 
The following referred to divorce cases are not concerned with the issue 
of contempt or a termination of parental rights. For either issue it may be 
appropriately argued that an impecunious litigant should be entitled to at least 
transcripts, and likely counsel as well, at no cost. This is because the indigent 
litigant defending contempt is exposed to the possibility of incarceration. Both 
that potentiality and a termination of parental rights would deprive the 
indigent to a fundamental right. Even though such potential deprivation is not 
present in the following cases, still, the rulings issued substantiate the 
importance of equal protection and equal access when discussing the absence 
of a transcript, or the right thereto at no cost, and other related matters. 
C) Pursuasive Authority from other Jursidictions 
In the divorce case of Cugini v. Cuerini. 538 A.2d 1060 (Conn.App., 
1988), both parties appeared "in pro se". The Appellant therein filed a 
motion for permission to proceed in form pauperis and for a transcript at no 
cost. The motions were granted. The Appellant provided the free transcript 
but the 
Appellee filed no brief. For Appellee's failure to file a brief the Court stated, 
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"Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of procedure, we do give 
great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice may both be done and 
be seen to be done." 
In the very recent divorce case of Clement v. Clement, 554 So.2d 292 
(La.App. 1989) decided last December 13th, the Court relying on statutory 
bases stated, 
Litigants who have insufficient means to prosecute or defend 
a claim may be relieved of the requirement to pay costs in 
advance as they accrue, or of furnishing security. C.C.P. art. 
5181. To do so, the party must be qualified by the court and 
given permission to proceed in forma pauperis. The rights of the 
party permitted to proceed in this manner include the right to 
receive a transcript and preparation of the record for appeal. LSA-
C.C.P. art. 5185. (Emphasis added) 
In the divorce case of Johnston v. Johnston. 573 S.W.2d 406 (Miss.App. 
1978) the Appellant was granted her motion to waive the filing fees but was 
not provided a transcript. The Court found, 
As previously stated, this Court is without any record taken at the 
hearing on Emma's application in this area. [Attorneys fees] 
However, the record which has been preserved, though lacking in 
desirable detail, demonstrates Emma's lack of financial resources. 
This conclusion is vitally bolstered by the trial court's order 
permitting her to pursue this appeal in "forma pauperis." 
In the divorce case of Re vis v. Re vis, not reported in S.W.2d (Tenn.App., 
1987 WL 11124), the West Law computer terminal access print out of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "C", the Appellant therein was in the same 
financial and legally estopped situation as Appellant herein. On Appellant-
Father 's Petition to rehear, the Court stated, 
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The principle thrust of Mr. Revis' [Appellant] petition to 
rehear is that he attempted on several occasions, both at the trial 
level and at the appellate level to have the Court furnish him a 
transcript, presumably at the State's expense. These requests were 
denied and he, not without some justification, points out that the 
Court would not furnish him a transcript but nevertheless affirmed 
the case because the statement of the evidence was inadequate. 
We recognize that may appear to be an anomalous situation. 
However, there is no authority for an indigent in a civil case to 
obtain a transcript of the record at the State's expense. The only 
solution to the dilemma is for Mr. Revis [Appellant] to take 
particular pains to see that all of the relevant evidence is 
contained in the statement of the evidence. 
Paragraph (g) of Rule 11 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
[Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when 
transcript is unavailable] states as follows: 
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial 
was made or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may 
prepare a statement of the evidence or proceeding from the best 
available means, including the appellant's recollection. (Emphasis 
added) 
Appellant contends he did this, though not by separate statement, 
through means of his appellate brief, since settlement of such a statement by 
the trial Court, inevitably being objected to by Respondent, would have gone 
to the issues on appeal. 
What really matters about the issue of the absence of a transcript in 
this case is whether the State of Utah will unfairly prejudice the Appellant 
because of his financial impecuniosity. Such prejudice should not find place in 
any state proclaiming equal protection within and equal access to its judicial 
system. 
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Some Appellants without funds to pay for required axillary costs 
necessary to pursue divorce related matters in the Courts of their states have 
resorted successfully in bringing proceedings in mandamus, seeking to compel 
the judges who denied them such means at no cost. 
In the divorce related case of Johnson v. Stevens, 265 S.E.2d 764 
(W.Va., 1980), where the Appellant did so, the Court quoted from Boddie v. 
Connecticut 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) supporting its 
ruling that the state pay for necessary axillary costs as follows: 
Where money determines not merely "the kind of trial a 
man gets", Griffin v. Illinois, supra, 351 U.S. [12] at 19, 76 S.Ct. 
[585] at 591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), but whether he gets into 
court at all, the great principle of equal protection becomes a 
mockery. A State may not make its judicial processes available 
to some but deny them to others simply because they cannot pay 
a fee. 
Boddie was cited at length by Appellant herein in his supporting 
Memorandum to his Motion before the trial Court to proceed "in forma 
pauperis" (Record on Appeal, p. 518). 
After quoting from Boddie. the Court in Johnson, supra, went on to say, 
...this State may not make its judicial processes available to some 
but deny them to others simply because of impecunious 
circumstances. Our legislature has made several provisions whereby 
needy persons will be afforded the rights and privileges guaranteed 
to them by the United States and West Virginia Constitutions. 
For example, W.Va.Code, 1931, as amended, provides that in any 
case where an indigent defendant has made a timely request for 
appeal he [or she] shall be provided with a transcript at the 
State's expense. 
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In the similar case of Hart v. Superior Court. County of Pima, 492 P.2d 
433 (Ariz.App. 1972), the Court stated, 
The petitioner's position in this special action is that the 
respondent's order deny the motion to waive costs of services of a 
court reporter for the certified transcript constitutes failure to 
exercise discretion which the respondent judge has a duty to 
exercise, or in the alternative constitutes a failure to perform a 
duty required by law and as to which he has no discretion. 
We believe that the issues in this special action have 
effectively been decided by the United States Supreme Court in 
Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 
113 (1971). 
Boddie further instructs us that (1) a state rule or statute 
generally valid may be unconstitutional on its application to certain 
individuals when it deprives those individuals of protected rights; 
(2) the right to be heard must be protected against denial by 
particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular 
individuals; and (3) a cost requirement valid on its face, may 
offend due process because it operate to foreclose a particular 
opportunity to be heard. 
See also, Tolson v. Lane. 569 S.W.2d 159 (Kentucky 1978) where the 
Court issued a writ of mandamus for similar purposes on the same grounds. 
In the divorce case of Burger v. Burger. 345 S.E.2d 18 (W.Va., 1986), 
the Court was likewise faced with a "pro se" Father-Appellant who had not 
provided the Court with a transcript. He had been denied such at no cost by 
the trial Court even though it recognized appellant as indigent. 
Proceeding only on the original record the appellate Court found that not 
only was the lower court's conclusion that State law did not provide for free 
transcripts in such cases to be error, but ruled that such error and others 
relating to the merits constituted grounds for reversal and also supported 
remand on the issue of attorneys fees awarded wife at trial which lacked 
adequate findings: 
The circuit court acknowledged his [father-appellant] indigent 
status but maintained that State law does not provide for free 
transcripts for indigents in civil cases. We find the lower court's 
conclusion on this matter to be error. For this reason and others 
relating to the merits as addressed below, we reverse. (Emphasis 
added) 
After finding that due to the paucity of findings by the trial Court the 
issue of child support be remanded, the Court concluded the following regarding 
attorney's fees: 
The attorney fee aspect of the order fails for essentially the 
same reason. The court perfunctorily ordered that the appellant 
pay the appellee's attorney fees of seven hundred dollars. In 
syllabus point 4 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Pitrolo. 
342 S.E.2d 156 (1986), we made clear that: 
Where attorney's fees are sought against a third 
party, the test of what should be considered a 
reasonable fee is determined not solely by the fee 
arrangement between the attorney and his client. The 
reasonableness of attorney's fees is generally based on 
broader factors such as: (1) the time and labor 
required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the 
attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the 
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client 
or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the 
results obtained: (9) the experience, reputation, and 
ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the 
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar 
cases. (Emphasis added) 
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Such considerations must be weighed and made part of the 
record in divorce actions where attorney fees are awarded. See 
Jones v. Jones. 345 S.E.2d 313 (W.Va. 1986). Upon remand, the 
fee award should be reconsidered in light of foregoing principles. 
Finally, we make clear that the appellant was entitled, upon 
satisfactory proof of indigency, to transcripts of the hearings in this 
action, without charge....If, following removal and entry of a new 
order the appellant wishes a transcript for appeal purposes, upon 
proper proof that he is still an indigent he is entitled to such 
without cost. 
D) Appellant Should not be Prejudiced for his Inability to Provide a Transcript, 
All the above rulings certainly support that Appellant's appeal should not 
be dismissed for his financial inability to provide this Court a transcript. 
More importantly they point out that to insure equal protection and access 
Appellant should have been entitled to a transcript at no cost under his 
request under impecunious affidavit for such. His requests have not yet been 
ruled on in this case by either the trial Court or this Court. See Young v. 
Young. 212 S.E.2d 310 (W.Vir. 1975), where the Court in the identical 
situation stated, 
From the date of filing, March 4, 1974, that affidavit was 
a sufficient notice to the court system of the State, including this 
Court, that the appellant is entitled, as a pauper, to access to the 
courts to contest the processes of law invoked against him in equal 
measure as is provided those who are able to pay for the use of 
our system of justice and the services of its officers. 
See also State, ex rel. Blevins v. Mowrev. 543 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio 1989) 
relying heavily on Boddie, supra, and Creel v. Creel, 201 So.2d 871 (Lou.App. 
1967) arriving at the same result prior to Boddie. supra. The year prior to 
Creel (1967), the American Bar Foundation Report entitled, "Public Provision 
for Costs and Expenses of Civil Litigation," stated that, 
Merely eliminating court fees and costs would not be enough 
to make the courts accessible to the poor. Some system is needed 
to cover the auxiliary expenses of litigation such as publication 
fees, bond premiums, fees of investigators and expert witnesses and 
* * court stenographers, (p. 5, 1966 draft.) [As quoted in Jeffreys 
v. Jeffreys. 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 82 (N.Y. 1968)] 
Last, they direct that, where in this case, no transcript is available 
through no fault of Appellant, that this Court has a duty to review the 
available record and reverse, remand, or otherwise rule appropriately. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW WERE BLATANTLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS 
JUDGMENT 
Respondent attempts to discount the specificity required by Rule 52(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This she does by arguing that the trial 
Court issued its rulings, now under appeal, based on a reflection of several 
previous rulings and some findings "laced throughout the record and when 
woven together created a central thread...". 
This issue on appeal is contested, not as much over the material used 
for "lacing" (previous rulings and findings). Rather, Appellant urges that the 
trial Court provided no basis to distinguish the type of "thread" (findings and 
conclusions at the hearing or trial) perceived by said Court. When casting into 
view such thread, Respondent argues "the trial court recognized defendant's 
failure to meet his court ordered support obligations, his unwillingness to abide 
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the court's ruling, and his contemptuous attitude." On each said element of 
the alleged thread, Respondent nowhere cites to the record and provides no 
evidence whatsoever of their existence. The trial Court nor this Court can 
turn mere laces of polyester into a chimera of silk thread as Respondent 
argues they should do. 
Appellant agrees with her interpretation of Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 
1080, 1082 (Utah, 1977) in that her thread analogy would be sufficient if it 
supported the judgment. The reason she did not cite the record pertaining to 
said alleged thread is that there is not one single finding or ruling anywhere 
throughout the record supporting that Appellant had ever failed to meet his 
court ordered support obligations, been unwilling to abide by the court's rulings, 
or been viewed as having a contemptuous attitude. 
These arguments she repeatedly plead for over a year and were found 
by the trial Court to be devoid of basis. Such pleading by her consumed 
unnecessary court time, lengthened the process to resolve the issues and caused 
both parties unnecessary legal expense. Such conduct should not be rewarded 
by requiring Appellant to pay fees for legal counsel when Appellant, though 
he may be justified, cannot recoup lost earnings or be otherwise compensated 
for representing himself "pro se" because he's not an attorney nor bar member. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
16 
POINT HI 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS, NEITHER AT TRIAL NOR IN 
DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
Respondent argues that Appellant has been "belligerent and quarrelsome" 
in causing Respondent to respond to his alleged 110 plus documents he filed 
with the court. Upon examination of the file this Court will find that 
Respondent herself filed approximately 90 such documents, the majority of 
which are assertive, not responsive types (Record on Appeal as a whole). 
Further, Appellant maintains that due to the continued refusal of her 
counsel to negotiate settlement (Record on Appeal, p. 675), respond to discovery 
(Record on Appeal, p. 186, 194, 226 and 489) and his notoriety among his 
peers for unnecessarily litigious (Record on Appeal, p. 703), support that 
Respondent be denied all attorneys fees. 
Actions taken by Bar Counsel for the Utah State Bar Association during 
the pendency of this action under peer review confirm opposing counsel's 
propensity for the above. He was suspended from the practice of law for a 
six month period in October, 1989, though said suspension was stayed pending 
his successful completion of a probationary period of the same length. (See 
Transmittal of Record, Order and Recommendation, Discipline by Consent, 
Amended Order of Discipline: Suspension/Probation) attached hereto as Exhibit 
"D".la) 
/// 
17 
Evidently, Respondent's counsel has failed to successfully complete said 
probation. Bar Counsel has recently recommended upon the testimony given 
by four complainants at disciplinary hearing held on February 7, 1990, that 
said suspension be implemented. (See • ^^J-*-*-*-^ 
attached hereto as Exhibit "E".la) Additional very likely forthcoming sanctions 
will result based on separate future hearings on the four individual complaints. 
To affirm the trial Court's award of attorneys fees or award such fees 
to Respondent on this appeal in the present context would send a message to 
the public that such conduct as Respondent's counsel has exhibited in this case, 
similar conduct for which he has been and continues to be disciplined, is 
sanctioned by the Utah judicial system. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has been financially and legally estopped from providing the 
Court of Appeal with a transcript. There is a total absence of findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, neither made orally nor written to support the Order 
issued by the trial. As a result, the Court has a duty to reach the merits 
on appeal which are conspicuously inconsistent with its judgment and the 
contents of the court file. 
Appellant has lost substantial earnings while seeking just results in the 
face of recalcitrant opposing counsel on the trial level and while pursuing this 
18 
appeal. Having spent over 120 hours on the appellate level and a few 
hundred hours on the trial level, such lost earnings far exceed the total 
amount asked for in Attorney's fees by Respondent. Wherefore, an award of 
attorneys fees, as mistakenly awarded by the trial court, or for this serious 
and sincere appeal, would be a gross injustice. 
DENNIS DONITHORNE 
Appellant, in Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have delivered eight true and accurate copies of 
the above Appellant's Reply Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 and mailed true and 
accurate copies to Richard Johnson, Attorney at Law, 1327 South 800 East, 
Suite 300, Orem Utah, 84058, postage prepaid, this 12th day of March, 1990. 
DENNIS DONITHORNE 
Appellant, in Pro Se 
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By 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA 
In Re the Marriage Of: CASE NO. 270589 
Petitioner: CONNIE L. DONITHORNE ORDER OF COURT 
and 
Respondent: DENNIS D. DONITHORNE 
/ 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on April 28, 
1989, in Department 40 of the Honorable James H. Libbey. 
Respondent DENNIS D. DONITHOJRNE did not appear personally but 
appeared through his attorney Lee C. Pearce. Neither Petitioner 
CONNIE L. DONITHORNE nor counsel on her behalf appeared. The 
court makes the following order: 
As the status dissolution has been previously entered on 
August 8, 1986, the court will make the following orders 
regarding the remaining issues: 
1. All community property left to be divided in this matter 
has been disposed of in the bankruptcy filed in the Northern 
District Court of California. 
2. This court does not have jurisdiction to enter orders 
1 children all reside in the state of Utah and the children have 
2 been residents of that state of Utah since 1986. 
3 3. With regards to current child and spousal support, while 
4 this court would have jurisdiction to make such orders, it is 
5 hereby determined that the state of Utah is a more appropriate 
6 forum for making such orders as evidence of the needs of the 
7 parties and the minor children and the abilities to earn are more 
3 readily available to the Utah court. 
9 4. The support set by this court in 1985 is under a motion 
10 for reconsideration. It is hereby determined that in 
H consideration of the passage of time presiding Judge Merrill has 
12 ordered the matter transferred to this department for 
13 determination and the following briefing schedule is set: 
14 a. RespondentVs papers shall be filed and mailed to 
15 the Petitioner and her counsel by May 8, 1989. 
16 b. As the Petitioner is out of state, she may respond 
17 ky written declaration with any documentary evidence she wishes 
18 to submit to the court for consideration with copies to 
19 R e s p o n d e n t ' s c o u n s e l . 
20 c . The m a t t e r w i l l s t a n d s u b m i t t e d on May 30, 1 9 8 9 , 
21 and t h e c o u r t w i l l r e n d e r a d e c i s i o n t h e r e a f t e r . 
22
 n l m n _ _ JAMES H. LIBBEY DATE !
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL - CCP 1013a, 2015.5 
I declare that: 
I am employed in the County of Contra Costa, California. I 
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within 
cause; my business address is 1475 North Broadway, Suite 400, 
Walnut Creek, California 94596. On May 5, 1989, I served the 
following documents in said cause: 
ORDER OF COURT 
on the persons listed below by placing a true copy thereof 
enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, 
in the United States mail at Walnut Creek, California, addressed 
as follows: 
Ms. Connie Roberts (Donithorne) 
417 West 600 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the 
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and 
that this declaration was executed on May 5, 1989, at Walnut 
Creek, California. 
Dennis Donithorne 
411 East State Road, #98 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Res. Phone: (801) 785-8639 
Off. Phone: (801) 374-8115 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA 
CONNIE LEE DONITHORNE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS DuWAYNE DONITHORNE 
Defendant. 
Case No. 270589 
DECLARATION OF DENNIS 
DuWAYNE DONITHORNE 
1 Now comes Dennis DuWayne Donithorne, Defendant in the above 
2 entitled matter and declares the following: 
3 1. I moved to Utah from Oregon in October, 1988. On 
4 February 7, 1989, the Fourth District Court for the State of 
5 Utah, Judge Boyd Park Presiding, took jurisdiction over the 
6 matter of ongoing child support. The court elected not to take 
7 jurisdiction over the matter of child support from the date of 
8 separation of my former spouse and myself to the date of trial on 
9 February 7, 1989, but deferred the matter to California. 
10 2. At trial on February 7, 1989, the Utah Court imputed my 
11 income at $1,500 per month without making any specific findings, 
12 though I was not working at the time. Since then, I have been 
13 hired as the Executive Director of a new father's rights organization 
14 entitled, Utah Fathers And Children Together, or UTAH FACT. The 
15 organization is in the process of applying as a non profit membership 
16 corporation in the state of Utah. I was able to successfully 
DECLARATION - Page 1 of 3 
1 negotiate a monthly salary of $1,500 per month starting April 1, 
2 1989. 
3 3. The Utah Court held a hearing on April 29, 1989 to fix 
4 the language of the order issuing from the trial held on February 
5 7, 1989. At that hearing it established ongoing child support at 
6 $293 per month plus one half of Connie's monthly medical insurance 
7 premium for the children based on the child support guidelines for 
8 the state of Utah using both parties income. 
9 4. From the time of our separation in April, 1985 to the 
10 date I was recently hired, I have made less than one-third the 
11 income that Connie has made. 
12 5. Connie admitted at trial on February 7, 1989 to having 
13 received over $20,000 from the proceeds of sales in 1985 of real 
14 property we owned in California and from child support I paid to 
15 her directly. All of the funds received by her from the sales of 
16 real property have been left unallocated by the above court. I 
17 did not receive one dime from the sales of any community real 
18 property. 
19 6. Our personal property was divided by Connie inappropriately 
20 entering our Danville residence several weeks after she had moved 
21 therefrom and by her simply taking all the personal property she 
22 wished. I was left with at best one-half of the total value of 
23 our personal property. 
24 7. Since she received all the funds from the sales of our 
25 real property and I received no distribution of community assets 
26 to offset such receipt on her part, all the monies she received 
DECLARATION - Page 2 of 3 
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from the real property sales should be allocated as to child 
support. 
8. Given the appropriateness of such allocation, if the 
above court in California were to establish my child support 
obligation for the period of time from April, 1985 through January, 
1989 at the amount arrived at by the court here in Utah, I would 
be entitled to a child support credit of several tnousand dollars. 
Given the income of the parties during the subject period of 
time, a finding by the above court of such a credit is appropriate, 
or at least a finding of no outstanding child support delinquency. 
9. I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing 
declaration is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
Dated this 2 ? ""^ of May, 1989. 
-^M^ 
T 
Dennis Donithorne, Defendant 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DECLARATION OF DENNIS DONITHORNE was made this date by mailing a 
true and correct copy of the same with first class postage prepaid 
from the Downtown Provo United States Post Office to the following: 
Richard B. Johnson 
Utah Attorney at Law for 
Plaintiff, Connie Roberts 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Connie Lee Roberts 
417 W. 600 N. 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Dated this of May, 1989. 
(y^<^-
Dennis Donithorne, Defendant 
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA 
In re the marriage of: 
CONNIE LEE DONITHORNE 
Plaintifff 
vs. 
DENNIS DuWAYNE DONITHORNE 
Defendant. 
NO. 270589 
NOTICE OF INTENDED 
DECISION 
/ 
Respondent's motion to reconsider the 1985 child 
support order is granted. Said order shall be replaced with 
the finding by the court at this time; that respondent has 
satisfied his child support obligation for the period from the 
filing of this proceeding to the point when first Utah child 
support order was made. 
The court finds that all community property has been 
lost through bankruptcy or foreclosure, except for the 
personal property and vehicles which have been equally 
divided. 
1 Counsel for respondent to prepare an order 
2 consistent with this notice and submit same to the court for 
3 11 signature. 
4 
51| DATED: JUN 2 8 t«88 
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ADDENDA "B" 
Defendant and Appellant's Request 
for Transcript and Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
*n 
Derm s s Dont thorne 
411 East State Poad, #76 
PI©9=ant Grove, Utah 340*2 
Phone: 374-3115 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
AND THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONNIE LEE ROBERTS 
f / K / e CONNIE LEE DONITHQRNE 
PI e i n 11 f f / P e s p o n d e n t , 
i> s . 
DENNIS DuUAYNE DONITHORNE 
De-fen dan t / A p p e l 1 an t . 
T r i a l Case N o . CV 8 8 - 3 4 
C o u r t or A p p e a l s No . 890 347-Crt 
DEFENDANT and APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 
AND A F F I D A V I T OF IMPECUNIOSITr 
D e t e r i d B r i t and n o p e l i 5 n t D e n n i s Don i t n c r ne , m : r o ze , h e r e t o 
r e q u e s t s a C C p ' o+ p a r t i a l f r a n s c r i p t o f t h a *• t r i a l h e l d b e f o r e 
t h e H o n o r a b l e Judqe B o * d L . c a r H on r e b r u a r ; c m e n c i n Q at-
that p o i n t the c o u r t h e a r d a r gume n t = r e 1 e t « «»e t c >» . = . t a t i or O H 
the minor c h i l d r e n of the p a r t i e s and D e f e n d a n t Mppellan*". 
D e f e n d a n t, M p p e 1 1 an t Dennis. Don i t h o r n e , b e i n g dul* =s-'orn on 
oath s a / s the fol loi-ung: P u s u a n t to Utah Code S e c t i o n 2 1 - 7 - 3 I 
do s o l e m n ! *' a f f i r m that- o w i n g to m / po'«ert*' I ami un a b l e to Dear 
the e x p e n s e s of the abo'^e r e q u e s t e d t r a n s c r i p t a n d that I e e r i l y 
b e l i e u e I am j u s t W e n t i t l t e d to the r e l i e f to be sought bv the 
A n n P 5 1 -fnr uihii-K = I I , - K +• r% =. r-. — »^  » ^ 4- .- ^ ^ - - .-. 
Dated thi5 of June , 1 ^ S' 
/ 
Doni thorns, Defendant MDoeii sn1 in Pro Ee 
ETM""E OF U T M H : 
CCPrr, OF U T M H : ss : 
Dennis Donithorne, being •£ 1 r = t dul*' =1 ior n on oath, deocses 
and sa*s: That he 1= the Defendant appellant
 sn the abone 
entitled ait ion, that he na = read the foregoing ntf id3i,i t and 
understands the contents thereo-r; ""hat *he same 1= "rue 0+ tn • s 
ci«»n f noi'il edge , e cep4" to matters there' n stated u:cn information 
anc Del ief , and as to such matter he bel ie,ies them to De true. 
Denn i s Don 1tnor ne 
. 'ESCRIBED M M D 5M0PN TO b e f o r e me t h • s 
A ? * d a . o f J u n e , 1= = * . 
E« i o n a t u c e • 7 ? e ' 
£ - • J O T M * 1 F U B L I C 
Pr 1 n t Name •» 
M , C omm i = = i o n e p i r e s /Yl/^?c_k 3 J J / 9 f 3 
NotaryPubfic T 
4000 So. Redwood Rd. #10781 • 
ft*t\felley. Utah 84123 J 
My Commission Expire* I 
Mareh30.19§3 I 
State of Irtah J 
I her eb v cert i f - that 3 true and correct :op' of tne 
foregoing D E F E N D M N T and M P P E L L M N T E. REOUEET FOR T F M N S C F I P T M N D 
M F F I L M M I T OF INPECUNIOSlTrt'jas made this date b> mailing a true 
and correct cop/ of the same i-u th first class po-staqe prepaid 
from the Downtown Prc-'o United States Post Office to the 
fol1QM1ng: 
Richard B. Johnson 
attorney at La««j for Plaintiff, Connie Roberts 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 30 0 
Or em, Utah 84053 
Dated th 1 s. of June, 198°. 
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ADDENDA "C" 
The divorce case of Revis v. Revis, 
not reported in S.W.2d (Tenn.App., 1987 WL 11124) 
COPR. <C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO 0PI6. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 
Citation Rank(R) Page(P) Database Mode 
Not Reported in S.W.Zd R 1 OF 1 P 1 OF 5 MFL-CS P 
1987 WL 11124 (Tenn.App. ) 
SEE COURT OF APPEALS RULE 12 
Wayne REVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Raquel REVIS, Defendant-Appellee. 
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section. 
May 22 , 1987. 
Opinion on Petition to Rehear Jul/ IS, 1987. 
Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court November 2, 1987. 
Hamilton Chancery, C.A. t 580, R. Vann Owens, Chancellor. 
Wayne Revis, Memphis, pro se. 
Allison G. Uiin, Chattanooga, for appellee. 
OPINION 
GODDARD, Judge. 
In this divorce proceeding, Wayne Revis , Plaintiff-Appellant, raises the 
following issues on appeal: 
I. Whether Plaintiff was represented by incompetent counsel, wherefore 
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. vJQPt-S 
Not Reported in S.W.2d R 1 OF 1 P 2 OF 5 MFL-CS F 
Plaintiff requests a retrial. 
II. Whether the court was unreasonable in its awards of parties property and 
payment for property. 
III. Whether the court was in error in its granting of custocK o+* parties 
minor child to Defendant. 
IV. Whether the court was unreasonable in the amount it ordered Plaintiff to 
pay in the form of debts in addition to child support payments to Defendant. 
U. Whether the court was unreasonable in its statement of a date for increased 
child support payments to take effect. 
UI. Whether the court was unreasonable in its award to Plaintiff cf visitation 
rights and phone calls. 
We are unable to address these issues because in our opinion the statement of 
the evidence filed by Mr. Revis, as amended by the Court in response to 
objections filed by Mrs. Revis, is not sufficient to permit us to mafe a 
meaningful review. 
We recognize that under Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
when a transcript is not to be* filed, it is the duty of the appellant to file 
"a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those 
issues that are the basis of the appeal." We also recognize that the Trial 
Court approving of objections filed by Mrs. Revis might be inferred to have 
approved the statement of Mr. Revis, as amended, to comply with the mandate of 
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 
Not Reported in S.W.2d R 1 OF 1 P 3 OF 5 MFL-CS P 
Rule 24. 
However, we adhere to our original opinion that meaningful review is 
impossible. We say this for a number of reasons. First, the trial of the case 
consumed three days and the statement of the evidence submitted by fir. Revis is 
only nine double-spaced letter-size pages in length. 
Moreover, the record contains nothing at all touching on the first issue. As 
to the issues relating to child support and division of property, the e\hibits 
and statement of income and liabilities mentioned in the Court's opinion have 
not been included in the record. Neither is there any information in the 
record as to the nature and value of personal property which was granted by the 
Court's order to the party in possession at the time of the hearing. 
As to the question of visitation and custody, there is little or no evidence 
relating to this issue, such as the temperament and character of either of 
mother or father, or the suitability of the residence where the child would be 
Kept . 
Before concluding, we observe that even if we should consider the record as 
containing all the evidence relative to the issues that are the basis of this 
appeal, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the 
determination of the Trial Judge. 
In light of the fact that the paucity of the record precluded a meaningful 
review of the issues and that an appeal in divorce cases does not suspend the 
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 
Not Reported in S.W.Zd R 1 OF 1 P 4 OF 5 MFL-CS P 
order of the trial court pending appeal, we overrule Mrs. Regis' motion that 
this be declared a frivolous appeal. 
For the foregoing reasons the Trial Court is affirmed and the cause 
remanded for such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary, and 
collection of costs below. Costs of appeal are adjudged against Mr. Revis. 
FRANKS and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. 
OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR 
GODDARD, Judge. 
The petition to rehear is not timely filed, having been filed on June 12, 
after entry of the original opinion on May 22. However, in light of Mr. Revis' 
representation in his petition to rehear that because he was absent from his 
residence he did not receive timely notice of our opinion, we are disposed to 
suspend Rule 12 and consider the petition on its merits. 
The principle thrust of Mr. Revis' petition to rehear is that he attempted on 
several occassions, both at the trial level and at the appellate level to have 
the Court furnish him a transcript, presumably at the State's expense. These 
requests were denied and he, not without some justification, points out that 
the Court would not furnish him a transcript but nevertheless affirmed the case 
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO GRIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 
Not Reported in S.W.Zd R I OF I P 5 OF 5 MFL-CS P 
because the statement of the evidence was inadequate. 
WE RECOGNIZE that MAY APPEAR to be an ANOMALOUS SITUATION. However, there is 
no authority for an indigent in a civil case to obtain a transcript of the 
record at the State's expense. The only solution to the dilemma is for Mr. 
Revis to take particular pains to see that all of the relevant evidence is 
contained in the statement of the evidence. 
For the foregoing reasons the petition to rehear is denied at the cost of the 
Pet it loner. 
FRANKS and ANDERSON, JJ. concur. 
Tenn.App. , 1987. 
Revis v. Revis 
1987 WL I 1124 (Tenn.App. ) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
ADDENDA "D" 
Transmittal of Record 
Order and Recommendation 
Discipline by Consent 
Amended Order of Discipline Suspension/Probation 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON 
) 
) 
) TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD 
) F-285 
A copy of the original record of the above entitled matter is 
herewith submitted to the Utah Supreme Court this / ? day of 
2"V 1989. dffl»FJid!dh^ 
Stephen F. Hutchinson 
Executive Director 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON 
DOB: 01/15/53 
Admitted: 04/26/79 
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 
F-285 
The Board of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State Bar at 
their regular meeting on June 16, 1989, having reviewed the 
Discipline by Consent entered into by Respondent and Bar Counsel 
on June 16, 1989, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby 
adopts and affirms the Discipline by Consent and recommends that 
the proposed discipline be accepted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this _i_ day of \ ^ ? A ~ ^ — , 1989. 
M 
BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
Kent M. Kasting, President 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order and Recommendation was mailed to Richard B. 
.te 300, Orem, 
.989. 
Johnson, Respondent, at 1327 South 800 East, Suit* 
Utah 84058 on this M7/v- day of i_\ \Uh '_ l! 
: J / 
i u 4y V'A< -/ 
Christine A. Burdick 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON 
DOB: 01/15/53 
Admitted: 04/26/79 
DISCIPLINE BY CONSENT 
F-285 
COMES NOW Respondent, Richard B. Johnson, and the 
Office of Bar Counsel, by and through Christine A. Burdick, 
Bar Counsel, pursuant to Rule XIII of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar and hereby resolve the 
above-captioned matter by consent based on the following 
admissions, statements and facts. 
I 
ADMISSIONS 
Respondent admits as follows: 
1. The Formal Complaint in the above-captioned matter 
cannot be successfully resisted, 
2. Respondent enters into this admission voluntarily, 
without duress or coercion, fully understanding the 
implications of his admissions and the misconduct, and that 
in exchange for these admissions, Bar Counsel has agreed to 
recommend that the Board of Bar Commissioners accept tne 
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discipline as set forth in this agreement as a fair and just 
resolution of the above-captioned matter. 
3. Respondent admits to violating Canon 6, DR 
6-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar. 
4. Respondent specifically admits the following 
factual allegations: 
a. In or about 1983 Respondent was retained by 
Garth Youd to represent him in an action style Garth Youd v. 
Zions First National Bank, et al; costs were advanced and 
attorney's fees were pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. 
b. Respondent timely filed and participated in 
discovery up to the point of pre-trial in this matter. 
c. A pre-trial conference was scheduled for April 
17, 1985. 
d. In approximately February 1985, after the 
deposition of Mr. Youd had been taken, Respondent indicated 
to his client that they would "gear up" again when the 
matter was closer to trial. 
e. Respondent did not appear at the pre-trial 
conference scheduled on April 17, 1985. 
f. Respondent failed to respond to phone calls 
and letters from opposing counsel regarding the attorney's 
conference which was scheduled prior to the pre-trial and 
failed to participate in the proposed pre-trial order. 
g. Respondent did not respond to inquiries from 
his client for status reports after February 1985. 
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h. The matter was dismissed with prejudice on 
April 25, 1985, by U.S. District Court Judge David K. Winder 
due to Respondent's failure to appear at the pre-trial 
conference. 
i. Approximately six months later, Respondent 
filed a Motion to Set Aside the order of dismissal with 
prejudice and on December 20, 1985, Judge Winder denied the 
Motion to Set Aside finding no excusable neglect. 
j. The clients were informed of the dismissal in 
approximately August 1985, when Mrs. Youd called 
Respondent's office to speak to him; the secretary informed 
her at that time of the Order of Dismissal. 
k. Respondent filed a timely appeal of the Motion 
to Set Aside with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
1. On or about October 31, 1986, the Tenth 
Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of prosecution 
pursuant to Rule XV of the Rules of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
m. The appeal was dismissed after several 
requests for extension to file a brief. 
n. Respondent claims as mitigating factors that 
he was heavily involved in the criminal representation of 
one of the Lafferty brothers during the time of the 
pre-trial order and dismissal and believed that the 
pleadings and correspondence on that matter were being 
forwarded to an associate in his law office for follow up; 
in fact, no associate in the firm was following the case. 
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o. Respondent accepts responsibility for not 
having neglected this legal matter and for failing to 
properly supervise the work which he believed was being 
accomplished by another attorney. 
II 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The Office of Bar Counsel, acknowledging the duty to 
protect the public but rigorously to enforce the ethical 
standards of the practice of law, has relied upon the 
following circumstances in offering and accepting the terms 
of discipline set forth below: 
AGGRAVATION: 
1. The period of neglect in this matter was 
substantial and involved not only inadequate communication 
with the client but also with opposing counsel to the 
detriment of the client and included a period of neglect at 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
MITIGATION: 
1. Respondent admits his neglect in this matter. 
2. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. 
Ill 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Subject to approval by the Board of Commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar and the Utah Supreme Court, Respondent 
and Bar Counsel agree to the following discipline: 
1. That a six-month suspension be imposed to be stayed 
on the condition that Respondent successfully complete a 
DISCIPLINE BY CONSENT - Paqe 4 
one-year probation on the following terms and conditions: 
a. That Respondent provide monthly status reports 
to clients in all open and active cases and timely return 
clients1 phone calls and respond to clients' requests for 
status reports; 
b. That Respondent provide to the Office of Bar 
Counsel on a monthly basis an affidavit setting forth his 
compliance with the requirement that he send monthly status 
reports as described in the preceding paragraph-
ed That Respondent meet with a supervising 
attorney, -f-f^c/^rtcl \/w {jyuux, on a bimonthly basis to review 
the status letters which he has sent out and to confirm with 
Respondent's secretary that he is timely returning phone 
calls both to counsel and to his clients and to assist the 
supervising attorney in preparing an affidavit to be signed 
by the supervising attorney setting forth that the 
supervising attorney has verified Respondent's compliance 
with the conditions of this probationary period; 
d. That Respondent not violate any of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct during the period of probation-
er That Respondent reimburse his clients, the 
Youds, for mileage, food and lodging in traveling to Utah to 
appear as witnesses at a disciplinary trial scheduled herein 
the sum of $150.00 and pay to the Utah State Bar the costs 
of prosecuting this action in the sume of $62.00, 
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2. At the successful conclusion of Respondent's period 
of probation, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated 
and this disciplinary matter concluded. 
DATED this day of \0U-X— , 1989. 
Richard B. Johnson 
Respondent 
Christine A. Burdick 
Bar Counsel 1/ 
y
 ll 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH rMQ ( d ' i ^ / 
In Re: 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON 
DOB: 01/15/53 
Admitted: 04/26/79 
AMENDED 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
SUSPENSION/PROBATION 
* 
F-285 p/,J«|^  
This matter having come on for review by this CourfcgTT > ^ gon 
..n* M 3 ^ i and the Court having reviewed the Discipline by Consen 1 
Clerk, Supram© Court, Utah 
dated June 16, 1989, and the Order and Recommendation of the 
Board of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State Bar dated June 
16, 1989, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
orders and decrees as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Discipline by Consent 
dated June 16, 1989, be and it hereby is accepted by the 
Court and incorporated herein by this reference. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That for violating Canon 6, DR 
6-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar, Respondent be and he hereby is suspended 
from the practice of law for a six-month period to be stayed 
on the condition that Respondent successfully complete a 
one-year probation as outlined on page 5 in the Discipline 
by Consent dated June 16, 1989. 
ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC July 25, 1989. 
DATED this / ' / ^ day of (J^Z&^<^', 1989. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
By: 
^^Cri-J $ r ^ 
Gordon R. Hall 
Chief Justice 
